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Notwithstanding the priority-based controversy following the Chrysler and
GM § 363(b) sales, value is the central dispute dominating the asset sale de-
bate. Given the mounting data purporting to show that sales harm junior credi-
tors by producing low value, I confront two issues in this article. First, I address
the depth and breadth of the low value phenomenon for junior creditors, con-
cluding that(a) although sales appear to cut deeply into creditor recoveries, cau-
sation has yet to be shown; and (b) sales have not, contrary to the predictions of
some scholars, overtaken reorganization.  Second, using qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis, I challenge four explanations of the low value phenomenon: weak
capital markets, secured creditor control, manager and financial advisor conflicts
of interest, and judicial corruption and forum shopping.  I conclude that none of
these explanations is satisfactory in light of junior creditor powers and the pro-
tective procedures that have evolved under § 363.  This conclusion stands even
in Delaware, which employs the business justification standard and is the forum
of choice for most large § 363 cases.
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INTRODUCTION
Aside from disputes over Bankruptcy Code integrity1 and absolute prior-
ity,2 the only objection to modern comprehensive3 § 363 sales, which are
1See, e.g., In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 415 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)) (stating
that judges should protect the “carefully crafted scheme” of Chapter 11).
2In 2009 and 2010, frantic commentators predicted that the § 363 asset sale in the Chrysler bank-
ruptcy, In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
dismissed sub nom., Loritz v. Chrysler LLC, 557 U.S. 961, 130 S. Ct. 41, 174 L. Ed. 2d 626 (2009), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom., Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC (In re Chrysler LLC),
130 S. Ct. 1015, 175 L. Ed. 2d 614 (2009) and judgment vacated, 592 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2010)—and in the
General Motors case, In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), certification denied,
409 B.R. 24 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) and aff’d sub nom. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 428 B.R. 43
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)—would lead to a replacement of Chapter 11 by priority-evading sub rosa reorganizations.
See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization after Chrysler and General Motors,
18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (2010); Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorgani-
zations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1375 (2010); Fred N. David,
Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler Bankruptcy and Its Impact on Future Business
Reorganizations, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 25 (2010); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler
Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010) (arguing that Chrysler inserted so much uncertainty into
financial markets—particularly regarding the absolute priority rule—that the cost of credit would increase
for distressed firms).
Later commentators correctly argued that Chrysler and General Motors were aberrations: reorganiza-
tion and absolute priority violations came to those cases by blending a recession, TARP funds, and govern-
ment strong-arming support for public policy. See Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Stephen J. Lubben, A
Comparative Study of Bankruptcy as Bailout, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 79 (2011); Robert M.
Fishman & Gordon E. Gouveia, What’s Driving Section 363 Sales after Chrysler and General Motors?, 19
J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 4 (2010); Stephen J. Lubben, No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context,
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sales of a Chapter 11 debtor’s assets outside the normal course of business, is
low value.4  Other objections, including the oft-repeated complaint that cred-
itors lack protection, are actually value-based because if creditors need pro-
tection, it is against low recovery.  Thus, the pervasive objection to § 363
sales is that too many debtors, or, more likely, powerful secured creditors like
debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lenders escape through a side door while freez-
ing weak creditors out of going-concern value.5
The current condition of value in comprehensive § 363 sales is not as
frightening for junior creditors as some claim.  In fact, junior creditors appear
to protect themselves in sales.  Part I introduces the general features of § 363
sales, which are governed by sparse and flexible statutory authority.  Against
this bare statutory canvas, bankruptcy courts have adopted standards, which
are analyzed in Part II(B)(4), to evaluate debtors’ proposed sales and sale
procedures in light of objections raised by creditors, U.S. Trustees, and po-
83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 531 (2009).  To calm critics further, the Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s
decision in Chrysler to preclude its precedential effect. See George W. Kuney, Vacating Chrysler (Univ. of
Tenn. Legal Studies Paper Series, Research Paper No. 116, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564299 (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
3I define comprehensive § 363 sales as those that dispose of at least half of the debtor’s assets.  By
definition, then, comprehensive sales often include the “crown jewel” of the corporation.
4Generally I adhere to Thomas Jackson’s definition of the purposes of Chapter 11 and, by extension,
§ 363 sales: “[c]hapter 11’s . . . provisions should be tested against the standard of whether they facilitate
achieving the asset deployment of greatest benefit to the claimants as a group.” THOMAS H. JACKSON,
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 210 (1986).  Thus, I define value as creditor-centric and
bounded by two questions.  First, will the sale generate more money for creditors than reorganization or
piecemeal liquidation?  Second, assuming sale is the right choice, does the price reflect reasonable valuation
of the assets?  Almost all discussion of equity holders will be omitted, as the central § 363 controversy
focuses on the unsecured creditor rung above equity holders.
5A freeze-out prevents junior creditors from exercising their call option in the firm’s residual value,
which is often most easily done in reorganization.  Their call option is essentially a bet that the firm will be
worth more in the future—an option hardly exercised in asset sales, which collapse the option to present
value, arguably destroying the potential upside while not preventing much downside risk. See Anthony J.
Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 759,
760–61, 785 (2011).  As explained by Professor Jackson, creditors can participate in going-concern value
through claim conversion, or turning a claim into stock in the reorganized company. JACKSON, supra note
4, at 211–12. See also Kimon Korres, Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing Chapter 11 Protections
through Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, and A Refined Standard
to Safeguard against Abuse, 63 FLA. L. REV. 959 (2011); Todd L. Friedman, The Unjustified Business
Justification Rule: A Reexamination of the Lionel Canon in Light of the Bankruptcies of Lehman, Chrysler,
and General Motors, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 181 (2010); Gennady Zilberman, Bankruptcy Section 363(b)
Sales: Market Test Procedures and Heightened Scrutiny of Expedited Sales May Prevent Abuses and Safe-
guard Creditors without Limiting the Power of the Courts, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 241 (2010);
Benjamin A. Berringer, “It’s All Just A Little Bit of History Repeating”: An Examination of the Chrysler and
GM Bankruptcies and Their Implications for Future Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
361, 387–88 (2010); Elizabeth B. Rose, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(b): The Opportunity for Sweetheart
Deals without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249 (2006); Craig A. Sloane, The Sub
Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditor Protections in Chapter 11, 16 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J.
37, 45 (1999).
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tential bidders.  Particularly, I introduce the influential business justification
(also known as “sound business purpose” or “business judgment”) standard6
and the emergent Gulf Coast Oil standard,7 which has been called the “sound
business purpose test with bite.”8  The different standards are based on fun-
damentally different views of asset sales, with the former built on the as-
sumption that DIPs fulfill their fiduciary duties to creditors and the latter
based on the notion that DIPs are unwilling or incapable of seeking high
value in bankruptcy.9  The lack of junior creditor objections in business justi-
fication cases,10 coupled with the documented strength of junior creditors’
committees,11 however, suggests that little reform is needed in the business
justification standard.
Nonetheless, § 363 sales are allegedly “fraught with potential for
abuse,”12 particularly in Delaware.  Studies led by Lynn LoPucki show that
§ 363 sales produce low value compared to reorganizations.13  Consequently,
reorganization-defending commentators use systemic corruption as an expla-
nation for this low value phenomenon.  Junior creditors, according to these
commentators, are frozen out of going-concern value because asset sales do
not provide the protections of reorganization or because credit markets are
incapable of producing sale prices high enough to capture going-concern
value.  In fact, capital markets might be so weak that going–concern value can
never be captured by sale.14  Furthermore, these commentators claim that
§ 363 sales are sweetheart deals for senior creditors, conflicted management,
6See, e.g., In re Dura Auto. Sys., No. 06-11202, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2764, at *258 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug.
15, 2007).
7In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 422 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009). This standard has been used in or has
influenced the following Chapter 11 cases: In re Cloverleaf Enters., Inc., No. 09-20056, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS
3019 (Bankr. D. Md. Apr. 2, 2010) (using portions of the standard to deny insufficiently marketed sale); In
re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009) (discussing the standard at length and using
it to evaluate a sale); In re Tidal Const. Co., Inc., 446 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2009) (noting Gulf
Coast Oil’s insistence on reorganization-like procedures in asset sales).
8Jessica Uziel, Section 363(b) Restructuring Meets the Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite: An
Opportunity to Rebalance the Competing Interests of Bankruptcy Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1189 (2011).
9This difference in interpreting the relationship between § 363 and Chapter 11 is due to lack of clarity
in the Bankruptcy Code regarding the relationship. See A. Joseph Warburton, Understanding the Bank-
ruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors: A Primer, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 531, 547–81 (2010).
10See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1, 37–38
(2007).
11Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of
Creditors’ Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REV. 749, 756 (2011) (noting that,
though imperfect, “committees are fulfilling at least part of their oversight responsibilities with some zeal”).
12Admin. of Large Bus. Bankr. Reorganizations: Has Competition for Big Cases Corrupted The Bank-
ruptcy System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 15 (2004) (statement of Lynn LoPucki).
13LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 24–25.
14Id. at 28–34.
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and stalking horses.15  Relatedly, some have argued that Delaware and, to a
lesser extent, the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”), are selected as
Chapter 11 forums so frequently because judges in these jurisdictions attract
self-serving senior creditors and managers and give them the quick and low-
value § 363 sales they desire.16
I question these assertions in Part II, showing that in most instances the
dominant concerns with § 363 sales either don’t exist or are unsubstantiated,
even in Delaware.  I conclude that currently, relevant stakeholders are able to
protect themselves.  However, there are areas of potential concern upon
which further research will shed more light, the most important being that
too many potential buyers drop out before bidding.  Nonetheless, based on
available data, the current state of § 363 sales should be defended.
I. THE BASICS OF § 363 SALES
The goal of comprehensive § 363 sales, like reorganization plans, is to
achieve the greatest value for a company’s creditors and shareholders while
preserving going-concern value.17  Section 363(b), which allow sale of a
debtor’s assets outside the normal course of business18 after notice and a hear-
ing, has been used since the Bankruptcy Code was passed in 1978.  The obvi-
ous advantage of these sales is the ability to quickly sell a debtor’s assets, free
from liabilities.19  The assets, as in Chapter 7, can be sold as a going concern
or liquidated piecemeal.20  Potential buyers include creditors, new entities
created for the purpose of continuing the debtor’s business absent its liabili-
ties, and especially bidders in the same industry.  By one estimate, approxi-
mately two-thirds of comprehensive corporate asset sales are made to an
industry competitor who already knows how to put the assets to work.21
Likewise, secured creditors are important factors in asset sales.  In addi-
15See supra note 5.
16LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 39–41.
17H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977) (“The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a
liquidation case, is to restructure a business’s financings so that it may continue to operate, provide its
employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders.”).
18There are no clear rules dictating whether a particular sale is in the ordinary course of business.
COMMERCIAL BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 7:2 (2012).  For present purposes, I focus on comprehensive
sales, which are clearly outside the ordinary course.
19This ability can certainly be controversial.  For example, when Chrysler was sold to Fiat-led New
Chrysler, future punitive damages liability was not part of the deal, meaning that harmed consumers could
not seek these damages if they were injured by a dangerous car made before 2009. See Mike Spector,
Chrysler Got Legal Shield in Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., April 4, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702304450004577277802983129074.html.
20See 11 U.S.C. § 721 (2006) (permitting trustee to operate the business to preserve going-concern
value).
21LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 29.
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tion to their influence over distressed debtors,22 § 363(k) permits secured
creditors to “credit bid” for assets using their allowed secured claims instead
of cash to bid on the estate’s assets.  The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
this practice.23  Their ability to credit bid, coupled with their intimate
knowledge of the debtor’s business, can grant secured creditors a leg up on
the bidding competition.24
Furthermore, a sale—irrespective of the buyer—can be made free and
clear of claims and interests as long as one of five conditions under § 363(f)25
is met as to each claim or interest.  Finally, under § 363(m), the buyer, if
acting in good faith, can take the assets with knowledge that the sale cannot
be reversed on appeal.  This provision gives certainty to the buyer but disal-
lows review of sales that, in hindsight, do not maximize the estate’s value.
When a debtor seeks a comprehensive § 363 sale—often after failing to
meet contingencies set by contract with a DIP financer who likely has a
super-priority secured claim on all of the debtor’s assets and who wants to be
repaid quickly when reorganization becomes unlikely—it uses an investment
bank to market its assets to various potential bidders.26  Many of these po-
tential bidders sign confidentiality agreements to gain access to the firm’s
financial data.27  The debtor then proposes bidding and sale procedures meant
22See infra Part II(B)(2).
23RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 182 L. Ed. 2d 967 (2012)
(upholding right of secured lender to credit bid even when asset is sold as part of reorganization plan in
which debtor seeks, under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), to auction the asset without credit bidding and give se-
cured lender proceeds of sale).  For a thorough discussion of credit bidding and its role in § 363 sales, see
Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy Auctions, 18 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 99 (2010).
24Credit bidding is generally permitted unless inside information is used to the detriment of the estate.
See Radnor Holdings Corp. v. Tennenbaum Capital Ptnrs., LLC, (In re Radnor Holdings Corp.), 353 B.R.
820, 845 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). . . The practice, however, is not without its critics.  See Jacob A. Kling,
Rethinking 363 Sales, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 258, 275-94 (2012).
25Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006),
The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest in such property of
an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is
greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
26See Casey, supra note 5 (arguing that junior creditors can be frozen out of going-concern value if
oversecured creditors seek and obtain a quick, low-value sale); Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morri-
son, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. L. ANAL. 511 (2009) (showing, based on their
sample, that Chapter 11 cases are significantly more likely to result in sale if DIP lenders are oversecured).
27See, e.g., Motion of Debtor and Debtor in Possession for the Entry of Orders (I) Approving Sale
Procedures with Respect to the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor’s Assets as a Going Concern, etc.,
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to select a stalking horse, take objections and hold a hearing on the proce-
dures, fix deadlines for the submission of qualified bids and objections to the
sale motion, conduct a sale auction, approve the prevailing bid at a hearing,
and close the sale—all within a few months.28
Individual creditors, creditor committees, United States Trustees, exam-
iners, and potential buyers can object to proposed sales and bidding proce-
dures under Rule 6004(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
converting sales into contested matters governed by Rule 9014.  Rule 9014,
in turn, allows for motions and hearings—with depositions and testimony of
interested parties’ competing investment bankers.  After a comprehensive
§ 363 sale is consummated, the proceeds are divided among creditors accord-
ing to the absolute priority rule, possibly in conjunction with a liquidation of
any remaining assets or a reorganization of what is left of the firm.29
Beyond the Federal Rules, court-specific procedural rules governing pro-
posed § 363 sales, like precedent-based standards judges use to approve or
deny sales on their merits,30 are not uniform across jurisdictions, but they are
all designed to protect creditors by allowing them to review and object to
proposed sales.  These local rules often govern who must receive notice; how
long before a hearing notice must be given; how objections can be made; how
public versus private sales will be conducted; and which connections, rela-
tionships, and compensation must be disclosed.31  Courts created these rules
to fill gaps in the Bankruptcy Code and to help streamline procedures to
allow interested parties to forecast, plan, and participate in the proposed sale.
at ¶ 15, In re Gottschalks, Inc., No. 09-BK-10157, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4874 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2009)
(noting that twenty-four potential buyers signed confidentiality agreements and were given detailed infor-
mation about Gottschalks, including access to an “electronic data room” created to give potential buyers
full access to the firm’s finances); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 34–35.
28See, e.g., id.  Of the cases cataloged in the LoPucki-UCLA Bankruptcy Research Database from
1982–2011, 30 of 127 comprehensive asset sales were approved within two months of filing Chapter 11.
29Theoretically, the absolute priority rule is more effective in asset sales than in reorganization.  Nego-
tiations when passing a plan of reorganization might anticipate a higher judicial valuation than actually
occurs after the plan is fixed, leading to promises of payment to junior creditors or equity holders who
would otherwise deserve nothing.  Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation
Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1943 (2006).  This problem should not
be present in asset sales, given that “[a] market transaction [sale] resolves valuation uncertainty by re-
warding the highest bidder with ownership of the asset. . . . When the business is sold in its entirety to a
third party, outcomes are, to a large extent, consistent with absolute priority . . . .” Id.  There is normally
no plan or its equivalent to fix rights against expected, rather than actual, valuation. Cf. In re Gulf Coast
Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 422 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (requiring that, whenever possible, creditors in § 363 sales
be given procedures as if they were following Chapter 11 rules; in this situation, where the creditors must
vote on the plan, the Chapter 11-based problem pointed to by Baird and Bernstein could exist).  This
potential side effect of the Gulf Coast Oil standard has yet to receive attention in the literature.
30These standards are discussed infra Part II(B)(4).
31For a dated but informative survey of the court rules that go beyond the Federal Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure, see George W. Kuney, Let’s Make It Official: Adding an Explicit Preplan Sale Process as
an Alternative Exit from Bankruptcy, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1265, 1305–22 (2004).
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They do little, however, to address the central controversy of § 363 sales:
value.
II. TAMING THE VALUE-CENTERED CONTROVERSY OF § 363
Most § 363-related commentary, including that of jurists,32 relates to
value.  A notable exception came after the Chrysler and General Motors
bankruptcies, when commentators focused on creditor protection, particu-
larly the absolute priority rule, which was arguably violated in both cases.33
In this Part, I examine four salient value-centered controversies under current
debate, preceded by a two-part introduction to the depth and breadth of the
low value phenomenon.
A. DEPTH AND BREADTH OF THE LOW VALUE PHENOMENON
1. Depth: How Large Is the Difference between Sale and
Reorganization?
Section 363 sales generally bring lower value than reorganizations.34
LoPucki and Doherty found that, when controlling for various factors,35 com-
prehensive sales achieved an average of only 35% of book value whereas reor-
ganizations achieved 80%, based on pre-bankruptcy book value and post-
reorganization market capitalization.36  This disparity is not without contro-
versy,37 and § 363 sales do not account for the entire difference,38 but a dif-
ference remains.  Employing a broader and less controlled approach, Harner
and Marincic found that unsecured creditors received more than 50% of their
claims in 57% of reorganizations, but received more than 50% of their claims
in only 28% of asset sales or liquidations.39  Lumping liquidations with asset
sales surely affected their results, but the finding is nevertheless concerning.
These studies fail to answer the most important value-related question: in
a particular asset sale, would reorganization have brought more value?  Even
32See, e.g., In re Humboldt Creamery, LLC, No. 09-11078, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2470, at *1–4 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2009) (arguing that the “melting ice cube” theory popularized in Chrysler was problem-
atic because “it is easy enough for the debtor to unplug the freezer prior to bankruptcy.”).
33See Brubaker & Tabb, supra note 2 (arguing that the absolute priority rule was violated in GM but
was not, strictly speaking, violated in Chrysler).
34Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 796 n.206; LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 24.
35Most importantly, they controlled for prepetition earnings and industry health, which, as they ex-
plain, are two of the fallback justifications for asset sales.
36LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 44.
37James J. White, Bankruptcy Noir, 106 MICH. L. REV. 691 (2008) (arguing that LoPucki & Doherty
(1) overstate creditor recoveries in reorganization; (2) select cases favorable to their agenda; and (3) inflate
the difference between reorganization and sale that is attributable to the sale decision rather than to
earning potential).
38LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 23–24 (stating that sale accounts for only 29% of the variance
observed between the two groups).
39Harner & Marincic, supra note 34.
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without that answer, however, the difference in average recovery between
asset sales and reorganization demands explanation.  The simplest answer is
that asset sales and reorganizations reflect different populations: one whose
value is maximized by sale and another whose value is maximized by reorgani-
zation.40  Merely because sales generally bring lower value compared to reor-
ganizations doesn’t mean that sales don’t maximize the value of any particular
estate in light of earning potential.  Had the sales been reorganizations, they
might have returned even less value than they achieved as sales. In other
words, managers, valuators, creditors, and courts might be getting it right.
Given the duties of managers, valuators, and courts—and the power of junior
creditors who often stand to recover nothing if they do not demand
value41—this is a reasonable starting point.
As shown below,42 LoPucki and Doherty avoid this reasonable interpre-
tation of the data and contend that sales are driven by failed capital markets,
strong secured creditors, self-serving managers and financial advisors, and
even courts.  These unsatisfying accounts do not reflect the simpler explana-
tions for the value disparity between sales and reorganizations. Before ad-
dressing those arguments, however, I demonstrate that § 363 sales have not
overrun reorganization.
2. Breadth: Is Reorganization Dead?
Low value, real or alleged, might not be very alarming if sales are infre-
quent.  They’re not infrequent, but neither are they as frequent as Professors
Baird and Rasmussen predicted in 2002.43  Further, the proportion of com-
prehensive sales to all large corporate Chapter 11 cases has not significantly
increased over the last decade (p = .81).  Thus, although § 363 sales are
undoubtedly here to stay, they have not overrun reorganization.
I analyzed Chapter 11 cases (N = 853) emerging from bankruptcy be-
tween 1982 and 2011 using data (as of February 24, 2012) from the UCLA-
LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, which tracks bankruptcies of public
corporations with assets of $100 million or more in 1980 dollars (about $273
million in 2011 dollars).44  Although a few sales did occur shortly after pas-
sage of the Bankruptcy Code, their use has grown over time and seems to
have reached a point of normalcy—not stasis, however, as the sales appear to
40White, supra note 37, at 702 (suggesting that LoPucki and Doherty’s study is plagued by selection
bias).
41See Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 764–65.
42Infra Part II(B).
43Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751–52
(2002).
44The Bankruptcy Research Database is available for academic research at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/
.  This database is also used for the data analysis in Part II(B)(4).
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ebb and flow with economic cycles.45
Until In re Lionel Corp.,46 which introduced the business justification
standard and expressly approved of easier access to asset sales as a matter of
congressional intent and bankruptcy policy,47 courts rarely allowed compre-
hensive § 363 sales outside of “emergency” situations in which an asset was
wasting away and losing value.48  After Lionel, as shown by Table 1 and
Chart 1, comprehensive § 363 sales took some time to become popular in
large corporate bankruptcies.  Since 1996, however, these large asset sales
have occurred multiple times each year, with high-water marks reached dur-
ing the Great Recession.  The largest annual proportion of § 363 sales to all
Chapter 11 cases (41%) came in 2008, while the largest raw number of sales
(24) was seen in 2009.  The past two years have returned the proportion of
§ 363 sales to normalcy, as 2010 and 2011 are closer to the sixteen-year
weighted average of 21%.  Only time will tell if there is a long-term trend of
45The reason for this ebb and flow is unclear.  LoPucki and Doherty argue that when an industry
encounters distress, other players in the industry are more likely to acquire the assets of floundering
industry competitors. Supra note 10, at 29.  I don’t dispute this argument, as it is apparent that industry
players buy up other industry players.  I would venture to guess that when firms in a distressed industry
have less access to capital—whether due to a 2008-style downturn or otherwise—those that are not
insolvent will seek to acquire as many of the industry’s assets as possible to increase their relative market
share and strength. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A
Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992) (saying that fewer acquisitions would take place
during times of industry distress).  This is often a difficult task. See Baird & Bernstein, supra note 29, at
1948 (arguing that it is challenging for “strategic buyers,” with their own debt and liquidity problems, to
obtain financing to purchase the assets of another industry player).
Buyers have little to lose.  If the entire industry is going downhill, they might go bankrupt regardless of
an acquisition; however, if the industry will emerge at some point, then buyers will be stronger for having
purchased their competitor’s assets.  Of course, for those industries that will struggle on rather than
emerge from troubles or die out altogether, the acquisition of assets, likely through debt financing, might
make the buyer insolvent.  But the buyer likely has little incentive to invest in itself if it thinks struggling
is its long-term fate.  More importantly, the sale price for the assets, like the probability of successful
reorganization, is probably low during these times, as there are few industry players strong enough to take
them on and there are even fewer investor coalitions willing to make a bet.  As for secured creditors
themselves, who due to their closeness with management have even more information than other bidders,
they will most likely join with a strategic buyer or will bid up the price themselves. See id. at 1949.  The
downside potential is higher for bidders who are not strategic buyers, as these parties might not be part of
a distressed industry that could be heading for general failure or major reform anyway.
Why are there not more reorganizations during periods of industry distress?  Because, I would argue,
creditors are unwilling to wait and see if reorganization is a better option. If convinced that the industry is
heading in the wrong direction, creditors want a quick exit.  Consequently, very few creditors object to
sales. See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 37–39.  As the economy stabilizes, the firms that haven’t
sold appear less likely to sell—as we can infer from the lower proportion of asset sales during the recovery
or stabilization periods of the mid-2000s and 2010–2011.  At this point, the firms can better predict
whether they will survive reorganization and compete in their respective industries.
46Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.) 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983).
47Id. at 1069–72.
48See Berringer, supra note 5, at 389.
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increasing § 363 sales, but that doesn’t seem to be the case given that sales
decreased as the recession abated in 2010 and 2011.
TABLE 1: LARGE CORPORATE CHAPTER 11 CASES BY
COMPREHENSIVE § 363 SALE, 1982–2011
# of § 363 Sale # of non-§ 363 All emerging Proportion of § 363
Year emerging Cases Ch. 11 cases Ch. 11 cases cases to all Ch. 11 cases*
1982 1 1 2 .5
1983 4 4 0
1984 1 5 6 .17
1985 10 10 0
1986 1 9 10 .1
1987 7 7 0
1988 8 8 0
1989 10 10 0
1990 16 16 0
1991 2 16 18 .11
1992 1 40 41 .02
1993 34 34 0
1994 28 28 0
1995 15 15 0
1996 3 13 16 .19
1997 3 18 21 .14
1998 2 14 16 .13
1999 4 31 35 .09
2000 11 32 43 .24
2001 15 42 57 .24
2002 18 74 92 .18
2003 18 64 82 .22
2004 9 43 52 .17
2005 4 25 29 .14
2006 2 19 21 .1
2007 5 19 24 .21
2008 9 13 22 .41
2009 24 40 64 .38
2010 4 43 47 .09
2011 5 17 23 .22
Weighted Average, 1996–2011 .21
*See Chart 1.
Thus, Baird and Rasmussen’s prediction (and others’ fear)49 that asset
sales would overrun reorganization never has been true—at least not for
large corporate cases.  Indeed, never have asset sales reached half of Chapter
11 cases.  The scope of the alleged low value phenomenon, while certainly
not trivial, is no broader now than the last decade’s average.  With this un-
49See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird & Rasmussen’s The
End of Bankruptcy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 645 (2003) (“[B]ankruptcy reorganization would remain necessary
even if firms could be sold for their full going-concern value.”); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is
Chapter 11 Bankrupt?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2005).
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derstanding of the depth and breadth of the phenomenon, I turn to popular
explanations for it.
B. WHY LOW VALUE? RESPONSES TO FOUR UNSATISFYING
ANSWERS
1. Weak Capital Markets
Baird and Rasmussen claim that capital markets are sufficiently liquid to
handle even the largest asset sales.50  Indeed, some of the large cases show
that billions of dollars can be gathered and change hands quite seamlessly.51
Even in the early 2000s, firms’ assets were being sold for huge sums.52  But
other commentators dispute that credit markets can regularly support high
value.53  I argue that if the bidding process leads to low value, this result is
50Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 786 (“The market for selling firms as going concerns is well-
developed.  In such a world, a straightforward path exists for keeping the assets of the firm together and
reestablishing coherent control rights.”).
51See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc’n Corp., 352 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting approval
of $17.6 billion asset sale to Time Warner and Comcast).
52See, e.g., In re Allegiance Telecommc’n, Inc., 356 B.R. 93, 96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“XO offered the
highest price, a combination of approximately $311.2 million in cash and 45,380,000 shares of XO common
stock”); In re Burlington Indus., Inc., No. 01-11282 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 1, 2003) (approving sale of $614
million); Gus G. Sentementes, Court OKs Bethlehem’s Sale to ISG, BALT. SUN, Apr. 23, 2003, at 1D ($1.5
billion sale); Margot Habiby, Enron CEO Says Debt, Other Claims May Total $100 Bln, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Apr. 12, 2002 (noting that Enron had agreed to sell water utility to YTL Corp. for $1.77 billion in
cash and assumed debt).
53See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 34–35; LoPucki, supra note 49, at 666–69 (noting
that, notwithstanding the possibility that capital markets have improved, many reorganizations still exist,
so prices must not be high enough to force them into sale).
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not due to bidders’ inability to raise capital but to bidders’ rational action in
light of available information.
Where investors and lenders are convinced of a return that is better than
alternatives, they will provide the capital or credit necessary to make a
purchase.54  Indeed, even distressed industries generate “developed, but not
perfect, market[s]” for asset sales.55  Yet LoPucki and Doherty decry the fact
that there are few firms that actually bid and that buyers generally come
from the same industry as the debtor, suggesting that credit markets are una-
ble to handle more competition.  Secured creditors attempting to gain control
of the company through credit bidding can also raise concerns, but these con-
cerns have been adequately explained.56  I argue that venture capitalists and
acquisitions lenders seek a high rate of return, and they are often most likely
to get that return from someone in the industry who can exploit economies of
scale, vertical integration, and so forth.57
Determining which few industry players are able to most profitably in-
corporate the debtor’s assets is not likely a complicated task for potential
bidders.  In Baird and Bernstein’s words, “It is the highest bidder’s perspec-
tive that counts,”58 and potential buyers are not unaware of who the highest
bidder is likely to be.  In the run up to an asset sale, the firm is shopped, even
by LoPucki and Doherty’s estimate, to 80 potential bidders,59 30 of whom
gain access to the company’s intimate financial data and conduct preliminary
valuations60 while simultaneously determining their own best use of the as-
sets and comparing their projected profitability to that of other potential
bidders.  This leads to most potential bidders voluntarily dropping out, leav-
ing just a few (1.6, on average—the stalking horse and perhaps one or two
others)61 who can expect an acceptable capitalization rate in light of opportu-
nity cost.  With so many dropping out before bidding, the bulk of the sale’s
surplus might go to buyers,62 but lack of liquid capital markets is not the
54See Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Option
for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 153, 182–83 (2004).
55Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 1950. Cf. Buccola & Keller, supra note 23, at 124 (“[T]here
are periods where capital is scarce even to the most credit-worthy borrowers.”).
56For a thorough discussion, see Buccola & Keller, supra note 23. Cf. Kling, supra note 24.
57See, e.g., Allegiance Telecommc’n, 356 B.R. at 97 (noting “XO’s [(the buyer’s)] strong desire to inte-
grate its business with Allegiance’s as soon as possible to obtain what XO believed to be $100 million to
$200 million of synergies”).
58Supra note 29, at 1943.
59LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 34–35.
60Id.
61Id.
62Surplus going to the buyer is surplus not going to creditors, but this distribution does not mean that
the sale should not occur. The sale is allocatively efficient if the buyer’s willingness to pay is higher than
the seller’s (representing creditors) marginal cost, measured by the opportunity cost of allocating the assets
in some other way.  Sale should not occur only if the price falls below the present estimated value of
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problem, as money is available if desired returns are possible.63  The problem
is the inability to give potential investors the return they seek when they are
forced to bid against industry powerhouses who can best exploit the assets.64
Further incentivizing dropout, going-concern value for firms is found
largely in relationships, which cost time and money to recreate after asset
sales.65  A buyer who does not already have relevant relationships in place or
who cannot reform them easily (as strategic buyers within the industry can)
will have to bid at a lower price to recoup the planned cost of relationship
building that will arise while reconstructing the going concern.66
Regardless of the dropouts, money is available if the return is right.  Po-
tential financers of buyouts can hardly be faulted for taking their bidding
money elsewhere if (1) their return will be higher elsewhere or (2) they know
that the comparatively higher return of a competing potential buyer will in-
centivize the latter to pay more to reach that return.  If investors have
hitched their wagon to one bidder who will make a predictably lower return
on the assets than another, they will promptly unhitch and leave the sunk
costs of valuation and pre-bidding research behind.  This is why so many
potential bidders with the ability to fund the purchase are contacted but so
few go beyond the valuation stage.
Thus, LoPucki and Doherty are not incorrect when they state that
“[b]ankruptcy reorganization provides a remedy for capital market inade-
reorganization or, much less likely, liquidation, which are measures of opportunity cost for creditors under
the absolute priority rule.  However, as I show below, creditors have options to obtain value regardless of
sale price, so their opportunity cost in asset sales is complex.  For an illustration of what sellers should do
when sale price falls below estimated reorganization value, see the Orleans Homebuilders example, infra
notes 105–106 and surrounding text.
63For example, it is estimated that hedge funds and private equity firms alone, which are extremely
active in the § 363 sale market, controlled more than $2 trillion in assets as of 2007.  Harvey R. Miller,
Chapter 11 in Transition—From Boom to Bust and into the Future, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 375 (2007).
Indeed, there is reportedly “relentless competition for deals . . . .  When the competition grows intense,
companies are sold at the high end of their valuations.” Hedge Fund Drive to Succeed Fuels Turnaround
Industry, HEDGE FUND DAILY, May 8, 2007 [hereinafter Hedge Fund Drive], available at http://www.
institutionalinvestor.com/article.aspx?articleID=1341144.
64Of course, investor coalitions not linked to an industry powerhouse do purchase the debtor’s assets
on occasion (about one-third of the time, according to LoPucki and Doherty).  LoPucki & Doherty, supra
note 10, at 29.  Much depends on the industry and whether economies of scope or scale are readily
available.  In the telecommunications industry, for example, where fiber optic switches are owned by
debtors that do not exploit their capacity, and where adjoining networks can be linked, economies of scale
are often easily obtained.  Allegiance Telecom and Adelphia Communications are great examples here. See
supra notes 51–52, 57 and accompanying text. Other industries might be very different.  To emphasize the
frequency with which industry players are the winning bidders, see George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002)
(arguing that § 363(f) makes bankruptcy court the forum of choice for mergers and acquisitions).
65LoPucki, supra note 49, at 652.  LoPucki was responding here to the contention, advanced by Baird
and Rasmussen, that assets have little going-concern value and can be unplugged from one firm and into
another when efficiency calls for the move. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 786.
66LoPucki, supra note 65.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\86-4\ABK403.txt unknown Seq: 15  7-DEC-12 15:42
2012) SECTION 363 SALES 605
quacy,”67 but they miss the point: even where capital markets are adequate
and many parties could fund a bid, there will not necessarily be many bidders.
The runners know who else is in the race, and there’s no medal for second
place.  Consequently, it can simultaneously be true that debtors are getting
the highest price available and the winning bidder is getting a great deal on
the assets—all without alleging that secured creditors force bad sales, manag-
ers are conflicted, advisors are lazy, and judges are corrupt—because competi-
tors drop out well before they expend resources on a bidding war they are
confident of losing.  This does not mean, however, that the highest price
available is as high as it would have been if the potential buyers did not know
who else was running.
Indeed, more information, especially information about other potential
buyers, can lead to prices below where they would be with less information.
That is, if the bidders did not know who else was in the race, they would bid
up to their opportunity cost rather than dropping out before bidding gets
started.  Preventing potential bidders from discovering who else might bid
would be almost impossible.  Nonetheless, some sales see many bidders.  As
long as there are multiple bidders with similar opportunity costs and similar
ability to exploit the assets, less sale surplus will go to the buyer and more
will go to the estate, as bidding will be more competitive.  Additionally, as
long as creditors use their powers, which I discuss in more detail in the next
section, they should be able to protect themselves from single-bidder sales
that do not produce fair value.  In fact, even if a sale is not made at what
junior creditors would consider a fair price and reorganization cannot be
forced, these creditors can extract payments as if the price were higher.
Thus, even if there is a bidder dropout problem, the parties who need protec-
tion appear to be protected.
2. Creditor Control
Creditors, and particularly secured creditors, exercise contractual control
over debtors-in-possession.  Many suspect that this control is dangerous
given that oversecured68 lenders can force asset sales in an attempt to cash
out quickly, leaving no or low recovery for junior creditors and limiting the
DIP’s fiduciary responsibility to all creditors.69  In addition to contractual
67LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 3.
68DIP financers generally acquire an all-assets lien. See Casey, supra note 5, at 774.
69See generally Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 760–62 (noting, however, the protections of the
bankruptcy court and U.S. Trustee against DIP lender control); Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic,
Behind Closed Doors: The Influence of Creditors in Business Reorganizations, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155
(2011); Andrew A. Wood, The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder Recoveries in Large Public
Company Bankruptcies, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429 (2011) (noting that secured credit makes up more of
debtors’ financial structures now, naturally leaving junior creditors with lower recoveries); Casey, supra
note 5, at 760–62; Miller, supra note 63, at 390 (“By controlling terms of the DIP agreement, creditors
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power, when a secured creditor is in danger of inadequate protection,70 that
creditor has a great deal of leverage to force a sale.71  Finally, secured credi-
tors in times of distress are often hedge funds rather than traditional banks,
and they demand high returns and have little patience for poor
performance.72
I present four responses to this explanation of the low value phenomenon.
a. Strength of Creditors’ Committees
First, unsecured creditors’ committees are strong, a fact not lost on them.
“Emboldened by . . . their relative lack of power compared to the all-mighty
DIP lenders and even second lien lenders, creditors’ committees in many cases
have begun to view themselves as the directors of the process.  They consider
themselves to be the owners of the debtors, a super board-of-directors of
sorts. . . .”73  Junior creditors, as noted by various scholars,74 have little to lose
by holding up a sale because they bear, in many cases, almost none of the
substitute the judgment and decision-making of the debtor-in-possession, who is supposed to serve as an
independent fiduciary, with that of a self-interested creditor who uses the process to protect its interests.
Effectively, the debtor-in-possession is neutered.”); Baird & Bernstein, supra note 29; Ayotte & Morrison,
supra note 26, at 514, 525 (discussing covenants imposing line-item budgets, profitability targets, and
deadlines for submitting reorganization plans); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and
the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006) (discussing extensive cove-
nants including replacement of managers, restricted access to further credit, etc. exercised by creditors
during trouble and bankruptcy); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 37. Cf. LoPucki, supra note 49, at
666 (“[C]reditors force few bankruptcy liquidations.  Firms liquidate in bankruptcy only after their boards
conclude that the firms could not survive even if bankruptcy relieved them of all their unsecured debt.  So
long as distressed firms can survive on their own, they exhibit an overwhelming preference for reorganiza-
tion over liquidation.”).
7011 U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(c), (e) (2006).
71According to Baird and Bernstein:
If the debt-free enterprise value of the debtor substantially exceeds the amount of
secured claims, the debtor has free cash flow to pay administrative expenses, and
the business is not declining in value after paying such expenses, the debtor may
well be able to demonstrate that secured creditors are adequately protected.  In
such circumstances, it will be difficult for the secured creditors—at least in the
early stages of the case—to insist upon a sale if the debtor opposes one, and an
adequate protection package typically is negotiated permitting the debtor to use the
secured creditors’ collateral, including cash collateral.
Supra note 29, at 1970 n.37.  If senior creditors are undersecured, they can push for reorganization and
“[t]hey are often willing to forego a market sale in order to recapitalize the debtor through a stand-alone
reorganization.” Id. at 1950.  Creditors can make the best choice between “selling the business to other
investors in a developed [(even where the industry is depressed)], but not perfect, market or acquiring it
themselves . . . .” Id.
72See Miller, supra note 63, at 393–94.
73Id. Note that, in many large cases, there are multiple creditors’ committees, as there are different
levels of creditors with different interests. See, e.g., Harner & Marincic, supra note 11; Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 136–40 (1990).
74See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 785 n.107 (citing sources).
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downside risk of extended time or reorganization.  “When the senior debt is
$100, the junior creditor prefers reorganization with a 50 percent chance of
$110 or $0 to a quick sale of $100.  Even though the reorganization has a
total expected return of $55, the junior creditor’s expected return ($5) is
greater than its return from the sale ($0).”75  This desire for junior creditors’
call option is coupled with power to extract it.
Committees have power to value the company at the estate’s expense;76
use their valuation to push for reorganization; seek appointment of an exam-
iner; ensure more oversight, protections, or time before sale by make objec-
tions to a proposed sale or procedures;77 and encourage more bidders, even
from among the ranks of junior creditors.78  Further, there are many examples
of junior creditors (and shareholders)79 defending their rights and even taking
value beyond their absolute priority.80  Relatedly, junior creditors can, and
75Id.
76LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 38 n.159.
77See Casey, supra note 5, at 785 (citing sources); LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 38–39 (argu-
ing that objections by creditors’ committees will not lead to higher value but will instead drain the estate
and lead to lower recoveries for junior creditors).
As for examiners, of the 142 § 363 cases in the Bankruptcy Research Database, only seven (5%) had an
examiner appointed.  Fifty-three (7.5%) of 711 non-§ 363 cases employed an examiner.  This difference is
not statistically significant (p = 0.23), and the fact that creditors in § 363 cases do not obtain the appoint-
ment of examiners in more § 363 cases, as they have a right to seek under 11 U.S.C. 1104(c) (2006), is
further evidence that they are content with their informal negotiations.
Some courts have given § 1104(c)(2) strict construction, requiring appointment of an examiner in cases
with qualifying debt of at least $5 million. See Loral Stockholders Protective Comm. v. Loral Space and
Commc’ns, Ltd. (In re Loral Space & Commc’ns, Ltd.), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25681, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 23, 2004); In re Erickson Ret. Comtys., LLC, 425 B.R. 309, 310–11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2010).  Others
disagree. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Wilmington Trust Co. (In re Spansion, Inc.), 426 B.R. 114, 126
(Bankr. D. Del. 2010) appeal dismissed, Ad Hoc Comm. of Convertible Noteholders v. Spansion Inc. (In re
Spansion Inc.), Civ. No. 10-369, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86152 (D. Del. Aug. 4, 2011).
As predicted by its disagreement with the strict statutory construction, the Delaware court approves
fewer motions to appoint examiners.  I found that 28 (80%) of 35 requests for the appointment of an
examiner made in Delaware were denied.  By contrast, in SDNY, 13 (54%) of 24 motions were denied.
Explanations for this phenomenon are potentially diverse, but I believe, until more data emerges, that the
answer lies in different jurisdictions’ interpretations of § 1104(c)(2), into which all of the cases in the
Bankruptcy Research Database almost certainly fall.  Judges everywhere define and limit examiners’ duties,
but courts are required to appoint an examiner if the statutory requirements of § 1104(c)(2) are met,
regardless of whether the judge thinks an examiner is necessary and whether the court gives the examiner
any responsibility upon appointment.  In Delaware, as Judge Carey opined, “I find no sound purpose in
appointing an examiner, only to significantly limit the examiner’s role when there exists insufficient basis
for an investigation.  To appoint an examiner with no meaningful duties strikes me as a wasteful exercise, a
result that could not have been intended by Congress.” Spansion, 426 B.R. at 127.
78See infra Part II(B)(2)(c).
79See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1983) (giving shareholders a return where they deserved none).
80See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 789; Baird & Bernstein, supra note 29, at 1932 (showing that
“[j]unior creditors invoke expensive and time-consuming procedures merely to extract a payout exceeding
their entitlements.”); Kerry O’Rourke, Valuation Uncertainty in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 2005
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 403, 433–34 (2005) (referring to In re Exide as example of powerful junior creditors
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often do, negotiate a carve-out with the secured creditor in return for their
support of the sale, thereby securing a guaranteed recovery before the sale
occurs.81  Creation of a carve-out on their own is, in my view, junior credi-
tors’ most powerful tool if judges, United States Trustees, examiners, and
DIPs fail them.
Many of these tools, or the threat of using them, are employed behind the
scenes, so creditors’ committees and individual junior creditors rarely object
to sales themselves, opting instead to prolong the process and seek more bid-
ders by using procedural objections.82  Indeed, they often push for cheaper
protection packages for stalking horses, more time or fewer restrictions for
bidding, etc., but they normally agree that sale is the appropriate response in
a given situation.83  Given that junior creditors face the greatest downside
risk when the wrong choice between reorganization and sale is made, and
given that they not only have access to the firm’s financial data but have the
power to value the firm and even bid from among their ranks if they want a
different outcome, the lack of objection—and lack of creditor-induced ap-
pointment of examiners—is telling.
Cynics, however, point to the few objections as evidence that creditors’
committees have been flogged into submission by debtor-favorable (i.e., senior
creditor-favorable) judges who will never rule to benefit a committee any-
way.84  This explanation ignores an important point: creditors’ committees,
charging their expenses to the estate, can make the process expensive and
long if they investigate the debtor’s operations, demand their own valuation,
file objections and extend hearings, seek appointment of examiners and trust-
ees, and even help DIPs respect their fiduciary duty to seek the highest value
for creditors.85  Even if the court does not side with creditors, the procedures
ensure that delaying the process and draining estate assets are effective tools
for committees that want reorganization, different procedures, or a rearrange-
ment of priority.86
who obtain “cram-up” plan against secured creditors through valuation battle); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 871
(1996) (noting that “certain features of Chapter 11 reorganizations tend either to waste value or to enrich
junior claimants at the expense of secured creditors”); Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the
Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155,
188 (1989) (discussing tradeoffs inherent in deviations from the creditors’ bargain).
81See Richard M. Bendix, Jr. & David E. Beker, Carve-Out Agreements for the Benefit of Unsecured
Creditors: Unanswered Questions, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J., April 2007, at 24.
82White, supra note 37, at 707 (using LoPucki and Doherty’s data to point out just two cases in which
objections were unsuccessful, one case in which they were, and 27 cases without objections).
83Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 784.
84LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 39.
85See, e.g., Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 764–65 (“Debtors often use the refrain, ‘Management
would like to pursue this deal but the creditors’ committee will never sign off on it.’ ”).
86See, e.g., Casey, supra note 5, at 789; Berringer, supra note 5, at 387–88.
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\86-4\ABK403.txt unknown Seq: 19  7-DEC-12 15:42
2012) SECTION 363 SALES 609
Even procedures under the business justification standard require notice,
allowance for independent valuations, bidding by interested parties, and other
protections.87  These procedures ensure that asset markets are generated
even in distressed industries,88 making the judge’s valuation task simpler and
surer.89
Further, all potential bidders not only have access to the virtual data
room but also to firm management and possibly even employees.90  Creditors
and potential bidders can object to a sale or sale procedures and timelines by
motion, and at least two hearings will be held: one approving sale procedures
and another before approving the sale.91  Thus, even the least restrictive pro-
cess seems adequate to seek a fair price for the assets, and although some
creditors “go to their fate kicking and screaming,”92 the very fact that proce-
dures allow them to delay and revalue shows that, at the very least, judges
are not ignoring the Bankruptcy Code.  Whether they systematically ignore
creditors’ valid protests is much more difficult to determine as, at best, there
are often large and legitimate differences between valuators’ appraisals of as-
sets’ worth.93  Even if it were true that judges rarely side with creditors’
substantive objections, the procedures give creditors power to extract value
through carve-out or other agreement behind the scenes.
b. Foreseeability and Protection by Contract
Second, the power balance in the event of trouble is not unfamiliar or
unpredictable to junior creditors, who can be expected to protect themselves
through their own contracts.94  Indeed, both before and during distress, se-
nior and junior creditors are not unaware of where they stand in line, what
87See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 5, at 191–92; Kuney, supra note 31, at 1290.See also infra Part
II(B)(4).
88Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1950.
89JACKSON, supra note 4, at 220; Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 YALE L.J. 83, 90 (2001); Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the
Politics of Finance, 4 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 13, 31 (Summer 1991); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for
Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 137 (1986); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A
New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 547 (1983). Cf. LoPucki & Doherty
supra note 10, at 10–11 (arguing that judges in reorganizations do a much better job of valuating compa-
nies than some give them credit for).
90Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1949.
9111 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2006) (requiring notice and hearing); Kuney, supra note 31, at 1290 (noting that,
generally, at least two hearings are held—one to approve the stalking horse and establish procedures, and
one to approve the sale after bidding).
92LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 38 (noting, however, that only two of their sampled cases
involved objecting creditors who were overruled).
93See at Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1951–52.
94Obvious exceptions to this proposition are what Bebchuck and Chang call “involuntary creditors,”
such as tort victims, who don’t have contracts with the debtor at all.  Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Howard
F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 274
(1992).
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they have to do to improve their position in return for another’s subordina-
tion, and so forth.95  If a junior creditor wants to avoid the power of secured
creditors ruling the roost during distress and bankruptcy, it can seek securi-
tization, a higher interest rate, or some control for itself in the event of things
going awry.
c. Creditor Protection through Creditor Bidding
Third, if junior creditors think they are being frozen out of going-concern
value by an inadequate sale price, they can make their own bid for the assets
by forming a coalition.96  A creditor who thinks she’s being shortchanged by
a proposed sale can try to find a team of investors, other creditors, and/or
strategic buyers to get the lost going concern-value for herself.  Indeed, credi-
tors’ committees, valuing the companies themselves, would not likely hesitate
to encourage more bidders from among their own ranks.  Charging the cost of
valuation to the estate would make the process cheaper for these bidders
than for others, but I can find no evidence that junior creditors regularly
attempt to protect themselves in this way.  It is possible that they, like other
potential bidders, are dissuaded by industry players with the capacity to best
exploit the assets, but I can also find no evidence that junior creditors attach
themselves to these dominant players (assuming the latter needs or would
accept help).  That junior creditors apparently do not bid or join bidders is
evidence that, in their view—and after behind-the-scenes negotiations and
carve-outs, where needed—they are not being frozen out of going-concern
value.
d. DIP Financing Does Not Lead to More Asset Sales
Fourth and most importantly, although the proportion of secured debt
may be the best predictor of a Delaware Chapter 11 filing—further support-
ing the notion that secured creditors take a role in forum selection—studies
suggest that DIP financing is actually correlated with higher rates of reorgani-
95See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 69, at 1951.
96This proposition has three potential transaction costs that can dissuade junior creditors from making
such a play in the asset sale context: “(1) liquidity constraints, (2) information constraints, (3) lack of
coordination among junior creditors . . . .” Casey, supra note 5, at 786 (noting another cost, that of negotia-
tion with secured creditors, which is not present in asset sales).  As long as capital markets are sufficient,
the first problem is overcome by creditors seeking outside investment partners or lenders.  The second is
largely—but not totally, as secured creditors presumably have had more access for a longer time—over-
come when creditors’ committees are given access to data rooms and management.  The third is only a
problem if many, most, or all junior creditors are, for some reason, required to participate.  It seems more
likely that even a small contingent of junior creditors could seek capital and bid on the assets.  If some
creditors don’t want to risk taking back their call option on the going-concern value of the firm, they don’t
have to; I don’t see collective action as a problem.  After all, even Casey recognizes that the junior credi-
tors’ bargain is in fact a bet.  If there are some junior creditors who don’t want to risk that bet, they can
opt out of the collective and take whatever the sale or reorganization gives them.
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zation, not lower.97  DIP financing improves the outlook of firms in Chapter
11 by providing funding where it might otherwise not exist, leading to
greater investor confidence and more successful reorganizations.98  DIP lend-
ers might have reasons, beyond immediate financial incentives, to seek the
highest value for the estate—even by reorganization.  These lenders presuma-
bly seek to be repeat players in the market for distressed debt, and pushing
for a low-value sale might earn them an unfavorable reputation.99  As long as
DIP lenders are adequately protected, their pursuit of highest value poten-
tially maintains a valuable reputation in the market and a long-term relation-
ship with the reorganized firm.
In the end, although the creditor control theory is a plausible problem
facing § 363 creditors, there is little evidence that control by DIP financers
actually leads to less value, and no evidence that junior creditors routinely
object to sales or seek the appointment of examiners in these situations any-
way, suggesting that they are not unhappy enough to protest.
3. Managerial and Financial Advisor Conflicts of Interest
LoPucki and Doherty claim that managers and financial advisors (i.e., in-
vestment banks) encourage asset sales due to conflicts of interest and self-
serving laziness.100  These explanations are deficient.
a. Managers
One might think that managers would benefit from a plan of reorganiza-
97See, e.g., Upinder S. Dhillon et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and the Resolution of Uncertainty
in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 3 J. FIN. STABILITY 238 (2007) (arguing that DIP financing leads to in-
creased probability of reorganization, given that the financing is a positive signal to the market that the
firm can be recovered); Sris Chatterjee et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 3097
(2004) (citing evidence that firms receiving DIP financing successfully emerge from bankruptcy signifi-
cantly more often than firms without financing); Sandeep Dahiya et al., Debtor-in-Possession Financing and
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 270–76 (2003) (arguing that DIP financ-
ing increases likelihood of emergence from Chapter 11); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority
of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 428–89 (1997). Cf. Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 26
(arguing that sale is more likely when lenders are oversecured).  Although Ayotte & Morrison might have
found a distinct subgroup of DIP lender cases, I would argue that the cases in their study are different:
they are those in which all-assets liens were permitted by the debtor, and all-asset liens are more likely
where reorganization is less likely (there is less need for an all-assets lien when the secured creditor is
confident of assets being profitably reorganized by the debtor).  That is, all-asset liens are more prevalent
when sale is of greater probability anyway, thus leading to bias in their study.
98Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reor-
ganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 462–67 (2006).
99Indeed, investment banks serving on the seller’s side might be a strong behind-the-scenes force in
seeking value.  If the bank, which expects to receive a success fee as a proportion of the sale price, fails to
ensure a high price, which turns out to be below the DIP lender’s secured claim, then they will not receive
that fee. See Stuart A. Laven, Jr., The Perils of Sell-Side 363 Sale Engagements: Protecting Your Success Fee
in Underwater Situations, 8 ABI COMM. NEWS (2011), available at http://www.abiworld.org/commit-
tees/newsletters/financialadvisors/vol8num4/perils.html.  Thus, they have an incentive, at least in situa-
tions in which they will not achieve their full fee, to push for more value.
100LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 32–37.
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tion, where they have a chance—however slim—of riding out the storm and
keeping their positions.101  Yet LoPucki and Doherty argue that, even where
a CEO has the chance to stay with a reorganized company, selling might be
better because they are hired as managers or consultants by the buying
firm102 or receive side payments and other undisclosed benefits in return for
making the sale happen.103  Eleven of the 30 CEOs in their sample received
such benefits.104
LoPucki and Doherty fail to show, however, that managers’ incentives for
sale are actually greater than their incentives to reorganize or that, more im-
portantly, the incentives are enough for them to abandon their duties to cred-
itors.  They also fail to show why the 19 CEOs who they could not show
receiving benefits from buyers apparently did not seek rents from those buy-
ers by balking, pushing for reorganization, or otherwise making the sale diffi-
cult.  A simpler explanation is that some buyers, 37% in the sample, want to
compensate the CEO for her continued expertise, not to purchase her sup-
port for a sale.  The other buyers, 63% in the sample, simply didn’t need the
CEO’s services moving forward and therefore didn’t pay for them.  The sales
appear to move forward either way, lending no support to the notion that
managers routinely violate their fiduciary duties to creditors.
To illustrate managers’ pursuit of value, consider In re Orleans
Homebuilders.  Orleans’ managers filed a motion to sell their assets, took bids,
found a stalking horse, took more bids, and used the stalking horse’s bid of
$170 million as the floor in negotiations with distressed asset investors, who
offered more for a stand-alone plan of reorganization.105  After withdrawing
the pending sale motion, Orleans attempted to terminate its agreement with
101Most don’t keep their positions.  Only four of 30 did in LoPucki and Doherty’s study.  White, supra
note 37, at 705.  For more information on manager replacement, see Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 26, at
538 (noting that 70% of CEOs are replaced in the two years prior to bankruptcy); Baird & Bernstein,
supra note 29, at 1932–33 (noting that management and directors are normally replaced before or during
the course of Chapter 11).
Note that most of the CEOs in LoPucki and Doherty’s study, including the four that kept their jobs
and the few that received other benefits, were likely CEOs put in place by DIP lenders or other secured
creditors.  Given Ayotte & Morrison’s figure of 70% replacement by creditors in the two years before a
bankruptcy filing, one might have expected to see many more of these presumably favored CEOs keeping
their jobs or getting benefits in the bankruptcy process.  That few executives receive such benefits is a
strong indication of managers’ tendency to respect their fiduciary duties to all creditors.
102See, e.g. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. (In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa.,
Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1986); see also LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE, 169–74
(2005).
103See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40–41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
104LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 32.
105Motion of the Debtors for Orders (A)(I) Approving Sale Procedures and Bidding Protections to Be
Employed in Connection with the Proposed Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets, (II) Schedul-
ing an Auction and Hearing to Consider Approval of the Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors’ Assets,
In re Orleans Homebuilders, Inc., No. 10-10684-PJW, 2010 WL 1484834 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 13, 2010).
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ABK\86-4\ABK403.txt unknown Seq: 23  7-DEC-12 15:42
2012) SECTION 363 SALES 613
the stalking horse106 and sought to establish the plan instead, all while seek-
ing more than $170 million in value for creditors.  These do not appear to be
the actions of conflicted managers.
b. Advisors
The corruption of financial advisors is also a difficult story to sell.  These
advisors, often investment banks, are professionals hired to determine
whether a sale or reorganization is preferable and, if sale is pursued, to solicit
bids and find a stalking horse.107  In addition to their base fees (such as a
retainer or progress fees, expense reimbursements, etc.), many banks are paid
a percentage fee of the sale.108  As mentioned, although the advisors solicit an
average of 80 buyers, 30 of which sign confidentiality agreements to access
the firm’s data room and management to conduct due valuation diligence,
very few (1.6, on average) formally bid.109  The low number of bidders,
LoPucki and Doherty argue, results from a conflict of interest.
Banks’ conflicts supposedly arise because they have little incentive to so-
licit additional bids, as doing so would be difficult and their contingent fees
might not justify the extra effort.110  “The flat percentage fee creates an in-
centive to provide the low level of effort necessary to sell at a low price and
earn the bulk of the fee, rather than the high level of effort necessary to sell at
a high price and earn the maximum fee.”111  This is an argument of insuffi-
cient marginal return for the banks,112 which are willing to lazily prepare
information for only 80 potential buyers and facilitate the diligence of just 30.
LoPucki and Doherty do not support this marginal return argument.  Instead,
they simply assume that (1) banks are not incentivized to shop the assets
beyond minimum effort and (2) 80 potential buyers and 30 with access to the
data room are not enough because few bidders actually emerge.
To even be argued, the first point needs data, such as the marginal cost of
seeking out more potential bidders versus the expected marginal benefit of
seeking them out.  It should be noted, at the very least, that by LoPucki and
Doherty’s own estimates, only one in 50 potential buyers ever bids (1.6 of
80), so banks might expect that they would have to contact at least 50 (and
many more if they have already contacted those most likely to bid) additional
106The stalking horse, NVR, sued for breach of contract. Complaint, In re Orleans Homebuilders, Inc.,
No. 10-10684-PJW, 2010 WL 2262315 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2010).
107LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 34–37.
108See, e.g., Dissecting Investment Bank Fees, MSILIMITED.COM, http://www.msilimited.com/Down
loads/Fees%20and%20Services.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
109LoPucki & Doherty do not address whether inter-bidder communication substitutes for formal bid-
ding, and I argue that just such communication leads to few bidders. See supra Part II(B)(1).
110LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 34–37.
111Id. at 35.
112LoPucki and Doherty, replying to White, state: “[I]nvestment bankers are maximizing their fee to
effort ratios . . . .”  LoPucki & Doherty, Bankruptcy Verite, 106 MICH. L. REV. 721, 736 (2008).
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parties to get one additional bidder—all while charging their retainer or pro-
gress fees and expenses to the estate.  Even if another bidder did appear,
would all of these fees be worth it to the estate?  Without data, this question
is impossible to answer, but one wonders why banks would not be incen-
tivized to pursue an efficient number of bidders based on their progress fees
alone, assuming there is not an alternative project with a much greater possi-
bility of a high contingent payout to which it could shift resources.
The second point, that 30 potential buyers valuing the firm is not enough,
seems odd on its face: to say that 30 potential buyers valuing the firm is not
enough—and they have full access to the firm’s financial information and at
least some access to management—is to question how many would be enough.
My argument, that most potential buyers drop out before they formally bid
(while gathering information about other contenders),113 is a better explana-
tion for why 80 potential buyers turns to 30 valuators, which in turn be-
comes 1.6 bidders.  Banks cannot force potential buyers to stay in the race
and there is no indication that seeking more potential buyers will produce
more bidders.  Thus, seeking additional bidders might actually be harmful to
the estate, as the likelihood that another bidder will arise might be out-
weighed by the progress fees and expenses paid to the bank.
As a final point, LoPucki and Doherty contend that the advisors’ deliver-
ing the company at a fire-sale price might engender good feeling and future
business from the buyer (the authors do not explain why the buyer would
trust such a double-crossing bank with its future business),114 creating more
conflicts of interest and further incentive to reach a low price.115  They fail to
explain why the multitude of potential bidders contacted by the investment
bank, many of whom evaluate the company, are incapable of bidding due to
the bank’s laziness.  The firms and creditors’ committees, charging valuation
costs to the estate, have full access to the company and the ability, through
their own investment banks, to conduct valuations, seek financing, and bid.
After the bank shops the assets out, gets dozens of potential buyers into the
data room, facilitates communication between the potential buyers and man-
agement, and secures a stalking horse, the matter is largely in potential buy-
ers’ hands.  Information is in the open by that point, and according to one
market expert, there is “relentless competition for deals . . . .”116  This relent-
less competition suggests that investment banks are doing their job without
unnecessarily wasting the estate’s assets on soliciting more buyers who won’t
bid.
113See supra Part II(B)(1).
114White, supra note 37, at 706.
115LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 35.
116Hedge Fund Drive, supra note 63 (statement of William Brandt, president and CEO of Development
Specialists, a corporate finance and turnaround consultant firm).
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Thus, there is little reason to believe that managers or advisors are con-
flicted or that such a conflict leads to additional and lower-value asset sales.
4. Judicial Corruption and Forum Shopping
LoPucki and Doherty argue that judges bend to debtors’ and lenders’ self-
serving desires for a quick, low-value sale while letting investment bankers
lazily neglect to bring bidders to the game.117  Because their sales orders can-
not be reversed on appeal, judges can attract a lucrative bankruptcy practice,
support local industry and tax revenues through bankruptcy activity and in-
corporation fees, and garner prestige by using the business justification stan-
dard to rubber-stamp quick sales proposed by debtors who, controlled by
oversecured creditors, file their bankruptcy petitions in Delaware or SDNY
for that very purpose.118  Professors Ayotte and Skeel,119 however, contend
that while secured creditors (particularly DIP financers) push debtors to file
in Delaware to protect their interests,120 debtors are also attracted by expert
Delaware judges (who issue objectively efficient judgments) and by value-
saving speed and no-nonsense standards (which reduce administrative costs
and get money to creditors sooner).121
There are three court-based arguments at the intersection of LoPucki and
Doherty and Ayotte and Skeel: (1) speed (the quicker the sale, the lower the
value; alternatively, the quicker the sale, the more value saved for credi-
tors122); (2) standards (the business justification rule allows the debtor and
DIP lenders to force sales that are never seriously questioned; alternatively,
the business justification rule is both procedurally predictable and substan-
tively sound); and (3) judicial role (judges in Delaware and SDNY bend to the
117LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 10, at 39–40; LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 112, at 736–37.
118LoPucki and Doherty point to excessive protections for stalking horses selected by the DIP, which
discourage other potential bidders; denial of objections to proposed sales or proposed sale procedures,
which discourage junior creditors from objecting in the first place; finding business justification simply
because the DIP wants a sale; and finding adequate value where there is little.  LoPucki & Doherty, supra
note 10, at 39–40. See LOPUCKI, supra note 102(arguing that, just as Delaware garners tax revenue by
attracting companies with its corporate law, it adds to its attraction by its § 363 business justification
rule).
It should be noted that, in Courting Failure, LoPucki argues that managers, advisors, and attorneys
make the self-serving decision to file in Delaware or, less likely, SDNY when choosing a forum outside
their own. Id. at 17.  Ayotte and Skeel, however, effectively showed that managers are subject to the
power of DIP lenders. Supra note 98.  In LoPucki and Doherty’s 2007 article, citing Ayotte, Skeel and
others, DIP lenders were factored into the forum selection analysis.  Thus, it seems that everyone agrees:
DIP lenders do indeed affect forum selection decisions.
119Skeel writes about this separately as well. DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT’S DOMINION 229–30 (2003).
120See supra Part II(B)(1).
121Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 98, at 458–62.
122Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 98. Although speed does reduce administrative costs and leads to
quicker recovery, LoPucki argues that at least in the reorganization context, these cost savings are not
worth the higher probability of worse performance and of refiling for bankruptcy protection. LOPUCKI,
supra note 102, at 98–117.
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will of self-serving debtors; alternatively, judges there are more expert, so
debtors seek them out).
With these three arguments in mind, I first reaffirm that forum selection,
as opposed to forum shopping, does occur.  Whereas “forum shopping” means
the selection of a forum to seek a selector-favorable judgment, in this article
“forum selection” means choosing a forum other than that of the company’s
headquarters for any reason.  Thus, shopping is a subset of selection.  I then
address each argument in turn, showing that (1) although it once was, Dela-
ware is not significantly quicker than other jurisdictions now, and SDNY
never has been; (2) there is little to fear in the business justification standard
other than, perhaps, a strong presumption in favor of managers’ judgments
that could stifle creditor opposition; and (3) the best explanation for forum
selection is judicial expertise and predictability.
a. Forum Selection and Forum Shopping
Data on forum selection is readily available,123 but forum shopping is
much more difficult to determine.  As demonstrated, Delaware does authorize
more large corporate § 363 sales than any other jurisdiction,124 and SDNY is
a sizeable second.  The proportion of cases involving a § 363 sale to other
cases in these jurisdictions is also high, and both are often sought through
forum selection.  Whether debtors seek out these courts for judges’ expertise
or for value-killing favoritism and weak standards is hard to tell from the
numbers alone.
I evaluated forum-selected cases (n = 522) using the 1982–2011 UCLA-
LoPucki data (N = 853), the results of which are summarized in Table 2.
Forum selection is more prevalent (p = .01) among cases involving § 363
sales than among non-prenegotiated, non-prepackaged cases confirmed with-
out a § 363 sale, and Delaware is the forum of choice for these forum-selected
sales.125  In fact, 68% of forum-selected § 363 cases go to the District of
Delaware.  Proportionally, Delaware is even more the forum of choice for
123Bankruptcy Research Database, supra note 44.
124The history of Delaware’s dominance is an interesting tale tied to the second Continental Airlines
bankruptcy.  The first, which was filed in Houston and is referred to below in the Gulf Coast Oil discus-
sion, ended in a contentious firestorm for Continental that led to the second.  When filing the second in
1990, Continental’s managers chose Delaware, unaware of what to expect but hoping for a more efficient
process than that offered in Houston.  They received it, and this led to others flocking to what became the
predictable expertise of Delaware. See SKEEL, supra note 119, at 229–230; LOPUCKI, supra note 102.
125In my analysis, of 142 cases involving § 363 sales from 1990–2011, 94, or 66%, were forum-se-
lected, 83 of which went to either SDNY (19) or Delaware (64).  Only 55% of non-363 cases that were
neither prenegotiated nor prepackaged were forum-selected.  (Also interesting is that 70% of prenego-
tiated plans and 74% of prepackaged plans were forum-selected.)  Of all § 363 cases, only 25 were filed in
SDNY, so six filed there were not forum-selected, while all 64 cases filed in Delaware were forum-selected.
This result is expected, as more companies are actually headquartered in New York, whereas companies
are often incorporated but not headquartered in Delaware, which gives them the right, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1408 (2006), to file there.
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§ 363 sales than for other Chapter 11 cases (p = .009).126 Thus, large corpo-
rate § 363 cases are forum-selected, especially to Delaware, at a higher rate
than other Chapter 11 cases generally.




Ch.11 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 303 169 381
Proportion of All (N = 853) Ch.11 Cases 36% 20% 45%
Forum-Selected Ch. 11 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 300 119 103
Proportion of All (n = 522) Forum-Selected Ch. 11 Cases 57% 23% 20%
Section 363 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 64 25 53
Proportion of All (n = 142) § 363 Cases 45% 18% 37%
Forum-Selected § 363 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 64 19 11
Proportion of All (n = 94)Forum-Selected § 363 Cases 68% 20% 12%
Of contemporary concern, as illustrated in Table 3, 108 of 141 (77%) of
large corporate cases filed from 2008 to 2011 were forum-selected, 67 of
which (62%) went to Delaware.127  Additionally, Delaware had 81% of fo-
rum-shopped § 363 cases and 58% of all § 363 cases during this period.128
Thus, preference for Delaware in terms of forum-selection generally, the share
of large cases going there, and § 363 forum shopping all appear to be increas-
ing.129  Why?  Is it due to speed, debtor-favorable standards, or judicial
expertise?
b. Speed Does Not Currently Drive the Increase in Delaware’s
Popularity
Based on their model and sample,130 Ayotte and Skeel concluded that
Delaware was a speedier jurisdiction—by an average of 168 days per Chap-
ter 11 case—leading to the conclusion that “the firms with better post-bank-
ruptcy prospects should rationally choose a longer, and hence more thorough,
126I found that 63% of all § 363 cases were filed in New York (18%) or Delaware (45%), whereas only
53% of non-§ 363 cases (n = 711) were filed in New York (19%) or Delaware (34%).  The proportion of
§ 363 cases filed in Delaware (45%) is higher still than those filed in Delaware without prenegotiated or
prepackaged plans (139 of 487, or 29%; p < .001).
127Of the 141 large corporate cases filed from 2008 through 2011, 108 (77%) were forum-selected,
with 67 of those going to Delaware and another 27 in SDNY, giving those two districts 67% of all large
bankruptcies.
128Twenty-eight § 363 cases (of 38 total) were filed in Delaware (22) or SDNY (6) during this time,
and 26 of those were forum-selected.  Just 27 total § 363 cases were forum-selected during this period,
giving Delaware and SDNY 97% of all forum-selected § 363 cases during the last four years.
129This conclusion should be tempered by possible recession-related effects that could reverse in com-
ing years.
130Their sample included cases from the years 1990–1999 involving at least $50 million in assets.
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 98, at 459.
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Ch.11 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 67 34 40
Proportion of All (N = 141) Ch.11 Cases 48% 24% 28%
Forum-Selected Ch. 11 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 67 27 14
Proportion of All  (n = 108) Forum-Selected Ch. 11 Cases 62% 25% 13%
Section 363 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 22 6 10
Proportion of All (n = 38) § 363 Cases 58% 16% 26%
Forum-Selected § 363 Cases Filed in the Jurisdiction 22 4 1
Proportion of All (n = 27) Forum-Selected § 363 Cases 81% 15% 4%
restructuring.  Firms with weaker prospects should rationally choose a faster
reorganization, which the Delaware court provided.”131  In other words, time
is money, and Delaware saved both in cases likely to end in asset sale any-
way.  In § 363 sales, the less searching, more debtor-trusting business justifi-
cation standard would presumably contribute to this speed.
Ayotte and Skeel’s analysis, however, is dated and hence subject to skep-
ticism.  Thus, again using the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research
Database, I conducted my own analysis of speed in large corporate bankrupt-
cies emerging from 1990 to 2011 and the four-year period from 2008 to 2011.
Analyzing 759 cases (those with time from filing to plan confirmation or com-
prehensive § 363 sale of no more than 1460 days or four years)132 emerging
by plan confirmation or comprehensive § 363 sale,133 I confirmed that Dela-
ware indeed was quicker than other jurisdictions, both in § 363 sales and
reorganizations.  It appears, however, to have lost that advantage.
From 1990–2011, the mean time spent in Delaware for all emerging cases
was 300 days, for SDNY 420 days and for all other cases 410 days.  Using
multivariate regression analysis,134  I found that when controlling for preban-
131Id. at 461–62.
132The dropped cases were all outliers in the sense that they were more than 1.5 times the interquar-
tile range above the 75th percentile, but most of them were not outliers according to Grubbs’s test.  In this
gray area, I elected to cut off the data at four years to keep the cases comparable.
133As Lehman Brothers illustrates, there is often much to do after a § 363 sale.  There, the sale came
just two days after filing for Chapter 11 protection, but Lehman did not leave bankruptcy (becoming a
liquidating company for creditors) for another 3.5 years. See Caroline Humer, Lehman Emerges from 3.5-
Year Bankruptcy, REUTERS.COM, March 6, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/06/us-leh-
man-idUSTRE8250WY20120306.
134To control for the positively skewed time to emergence variable, I took its log, thereby forcing a
more normal distribution.  Comparing regression results before and after the log, I found differences in the
estimates. For example, the non-logged variable predicted a time in bankruptcy of 96 days, not 137 (the
result, however, is still highly significant).
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kruptcy asset and sale size, jurisdiction,135 and whether a case used a compre-
hensive § 363 sale,136 filing in Delaware was associated with a significantly
shorter stay in bankruptcy (40%, or about 147 days) (p < .0001).137
Even in light of these strong Delaware-centric results, whether a § 363
sale occurred was the most significant predictor of time in bankruptcy from
1990–2011.  The mean time from filing to confirmed comprehensive § 363
sale was 190 days in Delaware (n = 59), 342 days in SDNY (n = 23) and 206
days in other jurisdictions (n = 49).  Although these might look like large
differences, the standard error of the estimate is so high for each of them that
neither is Delaware significantly faster nor is New York significantly slower
than the group of asset sales at large.  As an independent variable, however,
§ 363 sale is very significant.  That is, when predicting time to emergence
based on whether a case contains a § 363 sale, and controlling for jurisdiction
and assets and sales, cases with § 363 sales are predicted to be about 65%
faster than other emerging cases.138
Indeed, for 1990–2011, § 363 sales generally are quicker than plan confir-
mation, regardless of the jurisdiction, and Delaware is quicker to reach both
plan confirmation (46% faster than other non-363 cases) and § 363 sale.139
On the other hand, SDNY is not significantly speedy for this time period,
even controlling for large-asset bankruptcies that tend to be filed there.
For 2008 to 2011, however, a different story emerges.  Here, the statisti-
cal significance of quicker emergence after filing in Delaware disappears (p
=.12), even when controlling for asset sales.  Indeed, the coefficient itself
drops drastically, to -0.27, and the standard error is so high that all signifi-
135My jurisdiction dummy variables were (1) Delaware, (2) SDNY, and (3) Delaware and SDNY, with
all other jurisdictions being the other half of each binary variable.
136Delaware cases tend to be much smaller (on average, $1.7 billion in prepetition assets, compared to
$6.4 billion in SDNY and $3.2 billion for all other cases), so I controlled for prepetition sales and prepeti-
tion assets and dropped one significant (even by Grubbs’s test) outlier: Lehman Brothers, which claimed
over $712 billion in prepetition assets as of 2010.  By simple regression for the sample as a whole, asset size
is not significantly correlated with time in bankruptcy (r = .03; p = .4), and controlling for it did little to
the results—even though an easy explanation for Delaware’s speed is that its cases are smaller and, there-
fore, simpler.
137The r-squared value of, or amount of variance explained by, the model, however, was quite modest
when using the 1990–2011 data (r2 = 0.1).  So it comes as no surprise that there is more to explaining
variability in Chapter 11 speed than these variables.  The model as a whole, however, produced very
significant results (F = 21.56; p < .0001).
138It must be remembered that reaching a § 363 sale does not mean that the case is complete. See
supra note 133.  Many comprehensive sales involve just over half of a large company’s assets, leaving the
rest to be liquidated or reorganized.  Further, even if all or almost all of the assets are sold, distribution of
the assets must then occur, and arguments over claim values and priority can still abound.
139Prepackaged and prenegotiated plans were included in these calculations.  Excluding them markedly
increases the average time in bankruptcy, but I believe they should be included in the data as they are an
ever more common part of reorganization practice.  Further, including them in the data makes my conclu-
sions stronger.
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cance is gone.  In other words, we can’t say with any predictive confidence
that cases emerging in Delaware during these four years were any quicker
than those in other jurisdictions.  Some might argue that the recession sprung
an unexpected surprise on companies, which quickly filed for Chapter 11
protection in Delaware and then took time after filing to create an insolvency
plan rather than doing so before filing, but the mean time from filing to emer-
gence for the 149 cases emerging from 2008–2011 is only 250 days for all
jurisdictions—much shorter than the average of 369 days for 1990–2011.
Whatever explains the change, Delaware is no longer the king of speed,
but it is still dominant, with 76 (51%; SDNY had 23%) of 149 total cases
emerging from 2008–2011, including 22 (58%) of 38 comprehensive asset
sales.  If speed does not explain Delaware’s recently increasing dominance—
and assuming filing companies are aware that Delaware is no longer predict-
ably faster—we have to look elsewhere.  The best explanation is that debtors
file in Delaware because judges are more expert and standards are more pre-
dictable there, forcing debtors to contend only with creditors—not creditors
and unpredictable judge-made requirements.
c. Attracting Debtors with the Business Justification Standard
Valuation in bankruptcy, particularly when comparing immediate sale
value to potential future reorganization value, is “a guess compounded by an
estimate.”140  Courts, then, have to do the best they can with what they
have, and giving a great deal of weight to debtors’ business judgment seems
reasonable where the way forward is unclear.  Additionally, some have tied
forum selection to better outcomes in bankruptcy, given a race to the top and
market sanctions curbing opportunism.141  Yet others argue that, given the
capture of debtors by creditors and the influence of money on advisors and
debtors, the business judgment rule does not ensure efficiency and value for
creditors,142 procedural fairness,143 or some optimal combination of the
two.144  I argue that the business justification standard is better than its com-
petitor, the Gulf Coast Oil standard, which favors reorganization and dis-
trusts the DIP, because even assuming that creditors cannot effectively object
140H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 225 (1977); see Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510,
526 (1941) (“Since its application requires a prediction as to what will occur in the future, an estimate, as
distinguished from mathematical certitude, is all that can be made.”).
141See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by
Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357 (2000).
142Jason Brege, An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales, 92 VA. L. REV. 1639 (2006).
143Rose, supra note 5.
144Korres, supra note 5; Jessica Uziel, supra note 8 (advocating the approach in In re Gulf Coast Oil,
404 B.R. 407, 422 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) to more heartily question creditor protections); Casey, supra
note 5 (proposing an efficiency model meant to respect junior creditors’ call option value not currently
protected by the absolute priority rule).
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under the business justification standard, it allows them to draw out the
process and pursue backroom deals.
In Delaware (and the many other jurisdictions that use the business justi-
fication standard), “[b]ankruptcy courts routinely authorize the use or sale of
a debtor’s assets if such disposition or use is based upon the sound business
judgment of the debtor.”145  Sound business judgment is a malleable standard
at best, so the modern and widely-used version of the test generally requires
the judge to make four objective findings: (1) whether a sound business rea-
son exists for the proposed transaction; (2) whether fair and reasonable con-
sideration is provided—often determined by shopping the assets to potential
bidders; (3) whether the transaction has been proposed and negotiated in
good faith;146 and (4) whether adequate and reasonable notice is provided to
all interested parties, including the United States Trustee, the creditors’ com-
mittee(s), etc.147 In other words, the judge ensures procedural protections
and gives creditors a chance to protect themselves.
The Gulf Coast Oil standard,148 on the other hand, inserts the judge
145In re Capmark Fin. Group, Inc., 2011 WL 6013718, at ¶ 135 (Bankr. D. Del.), citing In re Dura
Auto. Sys., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2764, at *258 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 15, 2007); Ayers v. Martin (In re
Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 395 (3rd Cir. 1996); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel
Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1070 (2d Cir. 1983); Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd. v. Montgomery Ward Holding
Corp. (In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp.), 242 B.R. 147, 153 (D. Del. 1999) (“In determining
whether to authorize the use, sale or lease of property of the estate under this section, courts require the
debtor to show that a sound business purpose justifies such actions.”). See also In re Delaware Hudson Ry.
Co., 124 B.R. 169, 179 (Bankr. Del. 1991).
146The winning bidder must act in good faith to take the asset free and clear of other interests where
one of five requirements is fulfilled (363(f)) and to be protected against the sale being overturned on appeal
(363(m)).
147See, e.g., In re Exaeris, Inc., 380 B.R. 741, 744 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (requiring that a sale of assets
outside the ordinary course of business be supported by a sound business purpose, a fair sale price, ade-
quate and reasonable notice and good faith); Titusville Country Club v. PennBank (In re Titusville Coun-
try Club), 128 B.R. 396, 399 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (same); In re Indus. Valley Refrigeration & Air
Conditioning Supplies, Inc., 77 B.R. 15, 21 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (same). See also Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071
(setting forth the “sound business purpose” test); Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org.,
Inc. (In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 145–57 (3d Cir. 1986) (implicitly adopting the
business justification standard and adding the “good faith” requirement); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry.
Co., 124 B.R. 169, 176 (D. Del. 1991) (adopting, roughly, the four-part test given here, in addition to
requiring adequate protection for secured creditors; stating, “Once a court is satisfied that there is a sound
business reason or an emergency justifying the pre-confirmation sale the court must also determine that the
trustee has provided the interested parties with adequate and reasonable notice, that the sale price is fair
and reasonable and that the purchaser is proceeding in good faith.”).
Once the court is convinced that the sale is appropriate, it issues a boilerplate order touching on each
of these points. See, e.g., Order Approving the Sale of Assets Free and Clear of Liens, Claims, and Encum-
brances to Naviera Mexicana Neptuno. S.A. De C.V., In re Trico Marine Serv., Inc., No. 10-12653, 2010
WL 8033222 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2010); Order Authorizing Sale of Real Estate Equity Investment
Advisory Group Business Assets (Including Assumption and Assignment of Contracts) Free and Clear of
All Liens, Claims and Interests, In re Capmark Fin. Group Inc., No. 09-13684, 2009 WL 8519873 (Bankr.
D. Del. Oct. 25, 2009).
148This standard, according to the court, grows out of Fifth Circuit case law. See, e.g., Inst.
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deeply into the decision to sell, and the judge stands firmly on the side of the
creditors.  Chapter 11 procedures and creditor protections are at the heart of
the standard, and Judge Steen, citing LoPucki’s “fraught with potential for
abuse” language,149 said that Chapter 11-like protections (including class vot-
ing)150 should be employed in every proposed sale, effectively gutting the
efficiency gains that asset sales offer.151  Additionally, comprehensive sales
are to be subject to special scrutiny by the judge, even though creditors al-
ready have their rights to objection, voting, valuation, delay, and backroom
compromise.152  Thus, even if the creditors do not oppose the proposed sale
or procedures, the judge is required to be the adversary of the DIP.  Under
this standard, DIPs are required not only to show that they have satisfied
their fiduciary obligations to all creditors and presented a business justifica-
tion for the sale; they must also show a “valid business justification for the
process occurring separate from the plan confirmation process . . . .”153  The
standard disrupts the current balance between senior and junior creditors.
Consequently, assuming as true that “junior creditors are [already] forcing
firms that should be sold to languish in a wasteful reorganization process,”154
the Gulf Coast standard will lead even more firms down this path.
As long as junior creditors can protect their presently-valued call op-
tion,155 which is what the business justification standard allows, there is no
Creditors of Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223,
1227 (5th Cir. 1986) (reasoning, in rejecting a proposed assignment of leases under § 363(b), that “if a
debtor were allowed to reorganize the estate in some fundamental fashion pursuant to § 363(b), creditor’s
rights . . . might become meaningless.”); see generally Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways (In re
Braniff Airways), 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[i]n any future attempts to specify the terms
whereby a reorganization plan is to be adopted, the parties and the district court must scale the hurdles
erected in Chapter 11.”). Both of these cases, however, involved sub rosa plans in the truest sense: they
were methods not only of selling or assigning some asset but also of simultaneously reorganizing the debtor
as a going concern—without the approval of creditors, who objected and won. In Continental’s case, the
debtor was attempting to convert cash flow into a risky bet, and this business justification was not strong
enough in light of objections.
149See supra note 12.
150In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 422, 427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (stating that sales cannot
evade the “carefully crafted scheme” of the chapter 11 plan confirmation process, such as §§ 1125 (disclo-
sure and solicitation), 1126 (acceptance or rejection of plans), 1129(a)(7) (right of dissenters to receive at
least as much as they would receive in Chapter 7), and 1129(b)(2) (absolute priority and adequate assur-
ance) rights.  If these rights are violated as they are found in the statute, the standard requires that the
judge “fashion[ ] an appropriate protective measure modeled on those which would attend a reorganization
plan.”).
151I must note, however, that the only large § 363 sale in the Southern District of Texas since Gulf
Coast Oil, In re Seahawk Drilling, occurred just 53 days after filing.
152Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 422.
153Id. at 423.
154Casey, supra note 4, at 785.
155In valuing their call option, they likely weigh and average the probable values of reorganization
success and failure in their various iterations and come to a judgment about what the option is worth in
the present.
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need for the judicial intermeddling imposed by the Gulf Coast Oil standard.
After all, if junior creditors are convinced that they will get as much or more
by sale than they would by reorganization, why should the judge try to con-
vince them otherwise?  Even if the business justification standard stifles op-
position to a proposed sale, giving so much deference to debtors’ business
justifications that creditors can never win a motions battle, the standard still
allows creditors to valuate, delay, seek more bidders, obtain carve-outs, and
so on. More research is needed to determine how effectively creditors protect
themselves on and off the record, but available data show that they are not
unprotected in Delaware.156
Indeed, LoPucki and Doherty’s finding that creditors opposed sale in
three of 30 cases—and the creditors were successful in one of those cases—
suggests that creditors are not altogether afraid of objecting and that, when
they do object, they are not altogether ignored.157  Adding credence to this
claim are Harner and Marincic’s findings that creditors’ committees objected
in 27% of the § 363 sales they studied,158 that noncommittee parties also
objected to some sales,159 that more objections were filed in sales cases than
in reorganizations,160 and that a great deal of negotiation between debtors
and committees occurs behind the scenes.161  Pairing these findings with
others’ extensive work on the strength of creditors’ committees to draw out
estate value for themselves,162  I suggest that creditors under the business
justification standard are well protected—by themselves, certainly, even if
not by the judge.
The Gulf Coast Oil standard represents increased procedure and in-
creased uncertainty (and, therefore, increased borrowing costs)163 without
156See supra Parts II(B)(2)(a) and (b).
157See White, supra note 37, at 706–07; see also In re G.S. Distrib., Inc., 331 B.R. 552, 560 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“In light of [the largest creditor’s] objection to the private sales program, coupled with
the Debtor’s lack of an adequate business plan for such program, the Court finds that Debtor has failed to
demonstrate sound business judgment and cannot show that the program is in the best interests of the
estate.”).
158Harner & Marincic, supra note 11, at 784.  The disparity between LoPucki and Doherty’s estimate
and that by Harner and Marincic lies in the fact that the former counted only objections to sale, while




162Casey, supra note 5 at 785 (note that Professor Casey does not regard the strength of creditors as a
good thing—in fact, he sees it as a result of the absolute priority rule’s many distortions); Ayotte &
Morrison, supra note 26, at 514; Walter J. Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine in
Corporate Reorganizations, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 651, 681 (1974).
163Uncertainty is ineluctably linked to interest rates and creditors protections: where uncertainty is
higher, creditors demand more. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Reassessment of Bankruptcy Reorganization after
Chrysler and General Motors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 305 (2010) (arguing that capital costs were
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increased value for creditors.164  Given Judge Steen’s discomfort with § 363
sales,165 it is understandable that he would take upon himself the role of
procedural protector to force reorganization, but he apparently has little faith
in creditors.  When it comes to value, creditors are the best protectors of
creditors.  Until evidence emerges that creditors cannot protect themselves,
the business justification standard needs no modification.
Finally, from a manager and DIP lender perspective—and therefore a fo-
rum selection perspective—the business justification standard is preferable
because it is predictable: less judicial intervention, and, as shown in the next
subsection, more expertise when intervention occurs,166 allows the DIP to
converse with creditors and reach agreements for sales that can move predict-
ably forward.  Managers have little incentive to select a forum where the
judge is an unpredictable variable, injecting arguments where the creditors
need none and adding time and expensive complexity to the sale procedures.
d. Attracting Debtors with Judicial Expertise
In addition to employing simpler and more predictable standards, Dela-
ware bankruptcy judges are seen as more experienced in large cases, and debt-
ors seek them out for this expertise.167  Ayotte and Skeel show that firms
headquartered in states with less experienced judges are more likely to file in
Delaware.168  They also conducted a survey that showed an expertise-seeking
sentiment among debtors.169
I cannot disagree with Ayotte and Skeel on this point.  Delaware receives
more Chapter 11 cases generally, and more § 363 cases in particular, than
other jurisdictions.  With seven bankruptcy judges in Delaware170 and ten in
SDNY,171 it stands to reason that, given more large public Chapter 11 filings
and § 363 motions distributed among fewer judges, each Delaware judge
must oversee more of these large cases than do judges in SDNY—and almost
certainly more than in other jurisdictions.  Thus, Delaware judges do appear
to have more experience, which can plausibly lead to more expertise.
to increase due to the uncertainty inserted into bankruptcy practice and priorities by Chrysler and GM);
Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727 (2010) (similar).
164Hopefully enough data will be generated soon so that an empirical analysis of value under the
different standards can be made.
165Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 426 (“The accepted wisdom is that § 363(b) sales are quicker and less
expensive than plan confirmation, but the accepted wisdom is not necessarily correct.”).
166SKEEL, supra note 119, at 230.
167Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 98, at 458–62.
168Id. at 461.
169Id. at 459–60.
170See United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/
(last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
171See United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, http://www.nysb.
uscourts.gov/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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Further, as Skeel has argued, Delaware’s judges do not likely cater to
managers, given social pressure in that state to produce objectively stellar
judgments.  Reputational concerns, based on sophistication and responsive-
ness, lead to the conclusion that “Delaware decides cases quickly, and its
judges are viewed as having a realistic perspective on what must be done to
get a firm in and out of bankruptcy. . . .  When a firm files in Delaware, it can
be confident that Delaware’s judges will not provide unexpected
surprises.”172
A combination of experience, expertise, and predictable and cost-saving
standards is the best explanation for Delaware’s dominance.  Speed is not,
based on the last four years, a significant factor.  Additionally, judicial corrup-
tion and weak standards do not withstand reason, particularly given the lack
of creditor objection and the strength of creditors’ committees.
CONCLUSION
In closing, I have six conclusions, which correspond to each of the ques-
tions addressed in this article.  First, there might indeed be a value difference
between reorganizations and comprehensive § 363 sales of similar size, but
the disparity could be because debtors seeking asset sales are different—more
distressed and less likely to succeed in reorganization—than debtors seeking
reorganization.  Second, § 363 sales have not overtaken reorganization.
Third, although there is little reason to think that capital markets cannot
supply prices above debtors’ opportunity cost, the asset sale market is not
necessarily conducive to competitive bidding, as most potential buyers drop
out early.  Fourth, although creditors exercise contractual control over debt-
ors, this control does not appear to lead to more § 363 sales or lower value.
Fifth, neither managers nor financial advisors are conflicted such that they
seek low-value sales.  Sixth, Delaware is by far the forum of choice for large
corporate reorganizations and asset sales. Indeed, the “current state” of § 363
sales is, essentially, Delaware. Delaware’s attractiveness, however, does not
lie in value-killing and tax revenue-raising favoritism or in the speed of an
alleged rubber stamp.  Instead, debtors are attracted by judges’ expertise and
the forum’s simple, predictable, and sufficiently protective business justifica-
tion standard.
These six findings bolster my ultimate conclusion: the current state of
§ 363 sales deserves defending.  There are just two potential flaws in the
current picture.  First, too much sale surplus, assuming distribution is impor-
tant, might go to the buyer because most bidders drop out to cut their losses
when they are confident of losing the sale.  Information leads to attrition.
However, creditors’ committees, who value the company at the estate’s ex-
172SKEEL, supra note 119, at 230, 232.
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pense, protect themselves by seeking reorganization when more value is ar-
guably available there, by recruiting potential bidders, and by forcing carve-
outs or other backroom deals.  More research is needed to uncover the
boundaries of this potential problem, but presently it appears that creditors
can still protect their call option.  Second, although there is considerable evi-
dence that creditors protect themselves under the business justification stan-
dard, more research is required to definitively show that they are content
with the current scheme.
As long as junior creditors can protect themselves—and it currently ap-
pears that they can—the current state of § 363 sales, which protects value
and saves time, is precisely what these creditors want.
